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The development of IT, especially the emergence 
of Internet, has influenced the purchasing behaviors of 
customers in recent years. Many literatures argue that 
the Internet leads to intense price competition and the 
market will finally evolve into a frictionless state 
because the consumers can acquire the product 
information more and more easily. However, some 
research results show this is not always true. For 
example, Lee found that the price of used cars 
auctioned in the e-market is higher than that of the 
conventional market in Japan; Bailey did a research on 
the products, such as books, CD and software in 
Boston area and indicated that the e-market’s price is 
higher. So in order to explain the influence of 
information technology on consumers, we build a 
search model in this paper and use the search theory to 
analyze it. 
 
Our model inherits some characteristics from 
some previous search models and discusses an 
important variable--search cost. The first search model, 
the Hotelling Model, regarded travel costs as 
consumers’ search costs and pointed out that search 
cost is a source of monopolization. But it did not take 
the factor of sellers, which might influence the search 
cost as well, into account. Although Salop, Bakos, 
Zettlemeyer, Rajav Lal improved this aspect of 
Hotelling’s model, their definitions of search cost did 
not differ much from Hotelling’s in essence. Different 
with these models, we bring forward an inventive idea 
that the search costs are divided into two parts: one is 
called systematic search cost and the other is 
nonsystematic search cost. Systematic search cost is 
the cost of accessing a seller and negotiating the price, 
which may occur in every purchase, and it is a feature 
of markets. Both transportation fee and calling fee 
belong to this part. Generally speaking, buying the 
products in a conventional market would cost 
consumers more systematic search cost than in an 
e-market. On the other hand, nonsystematic search cost 
isn’t an innate feature of markets and can be controlled 
by sellers. They can manipulate this part of search 
costs through many ways like the products’ design, 
marketing, the layout of product-selling homepages 
and so on. The more the products deviate from the 
normal, the higher this kind of cost is. And the 
nonsystematic search cost is optional, which means 
that consumers may buy a product before knowing its 
exact utilities. 
  
In this paper, we mainly discuss the equilibrium 
of oligarch markets. It assumes there are two firms 
selling the same kind of products in the market. The 
first one is the leader and the other is the follower. 
Every consumer is buying at most one item from the 
two sellers and can return the dissatisfying items with 
paying the return cost, which is also a feature of 
market. It is supposed that there is no difference of 
quality between the products of the two sellers, but 
there may be some non-quality differences, such as the 
appearance and the design of the products. Consumers 
know the prices, the systematic search costs, and the 
non-systematic search costs. However, they don’t 
know the gross utilities they will derive from the 
product but know the distribution pattern of the utility. 
The search pattern of customers could be illustrated in 
a search tree. In each stage of the search tree, 
customers can choose an action from the action set 
according to the expected utility of each one. On the 
other hand, sellers must make the decisions of the two 
variables: prices and the nonsystematic search costs. 
The decision-making process is a two-stage 
perfect-information game. First, the sellers must seek 
the price equilibrium under certain combination of 
nonsystematic search cost. Secondly, after solving the 
problem of sub-game equilibrium, we can get the 
nonsystematic search cost equilibrium and it comes the 
equilibrium for the whole problem. 
 
By simulation, we get the equilibriums of the 
market for some special cases. And some managerial 
implications derived from the simulation results are 
that in a low-return-cost market, the higher systematic 
search cost, such as the transportation fee and the 
calling fee, may cause the followers of the market gain 
less. If this kind of search cost is high, people are 
relatively unwilling to search and buy the products of 
the less famous producer, that is, the follower’s 
products. And even after buying the follower’s 
products, because the return cost is low, many 
consumers would choose to return the dissatisfying 
items. So in a low-return-cost market, the higher 
systematic search cost is a disadvantage to the follower. 
It is recommended that the followers may invest in 
information technology, e.g. the Internet to make 
search easier and lower the systematic search cost. By 
realizing the information technology first, the follower 
can put the leader into a disadvantageous circumstance. 
Therefore, the leaders, on the other hand, should also 
utilize the technology to consolidate their power in the 
market as well. And in a high-return-cost market, the 
higher systematic search cost is also a disadvantage to 
the follower. The application of information 
technology can also benefit the follower and the leader. 
In addition, different from the low-return-cost market, 
our results show that in the high-return-cost market 
followers might choose to differentiate themselves to 
increase the non-systematic search cost. Because of the 
high nonsystematic search cost, the consumers would 
buy the products directly without knowing the exact 
utility of the product. Moreover, the high return cost 
would keep the consumers from returning the 
dissatisfying products. In this way, the followers lock 
the consumers who might originally not buy the 
products after knowing the exact utilities of them. 
Even if the leaders build the electronic transaction 
market firstly, the followers can also differentiate 
themselves to set a defense state against the 
competitors. 
 
